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Both constituents of the expression “general clause” open the door to the 
observation of interesting philosophical and dogmatic phenomena. On the one hand, 
the term clausula evokes a whole-part relationship; while on the other hand, generalis 
implies a genus-species taxonomic category pair. Within the expression of “general 
clause”, these two different systems of reference appear at the same time in a specific 
relationship with each other, which deserves special attention. 
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Through the analysis of the relationship of these categories, the main purpose 
of this paper is to establish a new framework for the better understanding of general 
clauses with the prospect of providing new, alternative interpretations, which could 
lay down a firm theoretical basis for the comparative analysis of a specific general 
clause to be conducted further on. 
 
 
The examples for this purpose have been selected from Roman law. The social 
and temporal characteristics of these demonstrative examples do not influence the 
general validity of the conclusions drawn since they are formulated at a moderately 
abstract level. The means of legal argumentation could well be derived from any 




First, the meaning of the two constituents of the expression: “clause” and its 
attribute, “general” ought to be defined. 
 
 
At the beginning of Classical Antiquity, the noun clausula had no fixed, 
technical, legal meaning, only as a grammatical, rhetoric expression did it have a 
certain usage: it referred to an isolated, self-contained part of the text. Also the legal 
texts preserved this original, grammatical meaning of the term: under clausula the 
decisive phrases of an edictum1, senatus consultum2 or lex3 were understood. This 
                                                          
1 Ulp. D. 4, 6, 26, 9: haec clausula edicto inserta est 
2 Ulp. D. 5, 3, 23 pr.: clausulam senatus consulti. 
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The other component of the expression, generalis4, an adjective derived from 
genus, was not used frequently in ancient legal texts. When applied, it was mainly 
used as meaning “generally”.5 It refers to a common source, to the entirety of a 
taxonomic category.6 Its noun, genus, appeared to be an inevitable concept for 
constructing systems and definitions already in the ancient times. 
 
 
Legal argumentations based on the common, everyday usage of “whole”, 
“part”, species, or genus often lead astray since the legal connotations of these words 
do not fully match their logical or denotative meaning. For instance “part” in legal 
usage does not always refer to a smaller unit than the “whole” and also, the species 
do not occupy in all cases a lower systemic level than the genus. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
3 Ait lex:  quanti is homo in eo anno plurimi fuisset quae clausula aestimationem habet damni, quod 
datum est. (Ulp. D. 9, 2, 21 pr.) 
4 For further informations about  generalis see Priscianus. Priscianus, Institutio de nomine et 
pronomine de verbo, III, 478, 5. 
5 Gai. D. 1, 7, 2 pr. 
6 Oxford Latin Dictionary, 757; Lucretius, 1, 590: ostendant maculas generalis corpore inesse; 
valamint D. 34, 2, 19, 10: nam vasorum appellatio generalis est, dicimus vasa vinaria et navalia; 
and D.1, 18, 1: Praesidis nomen generale est eoque et proconsules et legati caesaris et omnes 
provincias regentes, licet senatores sint, praesides appellantur: proconsulis appellatio specialis est. 
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Since general clauses are legal phenomena, before discussing the philosophical 
and legal theoretical problems inherent in the concept, it is necessary to define what 
is meant in this paper by “law”. 
 
 
The concept of law applied in this paper is two-faced7: on the one hand, it 
refers to a major system of rules; on the other hand, it signifies the totality of the 
related human acts.8 It is therefore equally connected to values bearing only an ideal 
presence as well as to the empirical reality of everyday life. This duality appears with 
respect to general clauses in a much stressful way since these norms – similarly to all 
legal norms but more pronouncedly – function as a bridge between the ever-changing 
values of everyday life and the relatively stable legal system. In case of these norms, 
to this external substantive duality an internal substantive duality is attached as well. 
General clauses also serve as limits of interpretation concerning the norms of a 
specific norm-aggregation; in other words: the meaning of general clauses unfolds 
from the mutual collision with other norms. This duplicity leads to the double 
systemic dependence of general clauses, which question will be addressed in more 
detail later on. 
 
 
In this paper I attempt to examine the first question, the position of general 
clauses in the legal system from a theoretical perspective. As opposed to this 
approach, investigating their materialization in the real life, on the one hand, would 
                                                          
7 See SOMLÓ, FELIX, Juristische Grundlehre, (1917), Leipzig, p. 123. For Hungarian aspects see 
KOVÁCS FERENC, A magyar jogi terminológia kialakulása, [The development of the Hungarian 
Legal Terminology], (1964), Budapest, p. 60. A logically based definition is given by SOLT 
KORNÉL, Jogi logika. A jog, a nyelv és a valóság, [Legal logic. The law, the Language and the 
Reality], I, (1996) Budapest, p. 16. 
8 MOÓR GYULA, A logikum a jogban, [The Logic in the Law] (1928) Budapest, p. 2. 
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require a large-scale processing of data belonging to the field of legal sociology and 
on the other hand, it would necessarily lead to the metaphysical problem of the 
relationship between value and positivity.9 
 
 
Within the legal system three different areas can be delineated, which, by their 
specific characteristics, contribute to the image of general clauses differently. These 
areas are: the legal order, jurisprudence and the application of law. The fourth branch 
naturally following from this categorization would be legislation, which, however, in 
the approach of this analysis is more interesting from the perspective of its product, 
the legal order. Thus, in this perspective, the realized legal order is meant to presume, 
quasi immanently incorporate the field of legislation. 
 
 
Among the above-mentioned, the most important area is the field of the 
practical application of law. It can be justified theoretically as well that the legal 
order and legal scholarship are – after all – aimed at serving the fulfilment of the aims 
of the application of law to the greatest possible extent. Accordingly, the literature on 
the application of general clauses is greatly extensive and usually concentrates on the 
following main question: is the general clause the queen of the legal order or rather a 
most compliant maid?10 With respect to the application of law, however, it is always 
a specific, discrete norm (for example the principle of bona fides or the principle of 
contra bonos mores) in relation to which it is rewarding to talk about it; in general – 
due to its specific nature – it is considerably difficult to draw sound conclusions. 
                                                          
9 MOÓR, cit. p. 3. 
10 AMHREIN, URSULA, Die Vereinbarkeit der gerichtlichen Generalklausel mit der 
Gewalteinteilung, (1958) München, p. 88. 
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Therefore, this subfield will be addressed only to the extent necessary for the 
purposes of this paper. 
 
 
Nevertheless, the literature examining the problems brought up by the concept 
of general clause is much scantier from the viewpoints of the legal order and legal 
scholarship. The legal order is typically a human product, the ultimate source of 
which can be found in the wistful, purposeful individual mind striving to fulfil its 
needs. In this sense, the legal order is an order of thoughts. It necessarily 
encompasses the basic categories of human thinking, but not with that incontestable 
consistence and to such a sophisticated extent as the systematization is accomplished 
by legal scholarship serving the pragmatic aims of the application of law. Thus, the 
one-sided application of formal logical schemes to the legal order does not bring 
about the desired outcome many times.11 
 
 
In the case of general clauses, however, the approach from the perspective of 
the legal order cannot be dispensed with since the concept of general clause places 
itself through the “clause” into a greater system consisting of the same genus. 
However, to determine the nature, the scope and the systemic level of the genus and 
the nature of the species belonging to that specific genus, falls within the tasks of 
jurisprudence. Thus, the examination shall be carried out with keeping the 
requirements as well as the specific characteristics of the two systems in view. 
 
 
                                                          
11 According to GUTTERIDGE the formal logic plays only a modest role in the legal reasoning. See 
GUTTERIDGE, HAROLD, An Introduction to the Comparative Method of Legal Study and Research, 
(1949) Cambridge, pp. 108-109. 
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In the next section the dialectic approach or in other words, the means of 
categorization will be briefly addressed, since both the whole-part and the genus-
species conceptual pairs are produced by this operation. 
 
 
II. The means of categorization 
 
 
Disintegration into parts belongs to the traditional methods of jurisprudence, 
which – among other factors – largely contributed to the arising of the occupation 
with legal rules to the standard of ars.12 
 
 
The dialectical method aiming at the scientific production of different 
categorizations appeared in Roman legal scholarship after the 3rd century AD, mostly 
conveyed by stoic philosophy. 13 The origins of stoic dialectics can be traced back to 
                                                          
12 Cicero, Brutus 152: rem universam tribuere in partes. Further see PÓLAY (1988), p. 96; FÖLDI, 
ANDRÁS, Az institutiones-hagyomány a jogi oktatás történetében, [The Tradition of the 
Institutiones-System in the Teaching of the Legal Sciences) in: Festgabe für János Zlinszky, (1998) 
Miskolc, pp. 547-. 
13 The mark of the stoa is sensible in the following fragment: res quae sine interitu dividi non 
possunt. See SCHNORR, V. CAROLSFELD, Geschichte der juristischen Person, (1993) München, pp. 
177-; SOKOLOWSKI, PAUL, Die Philosophie im Privatrecht, I, (1902) Halle, pp. 111-; HÄGERSTRÖM, 
AXEL, Der römische Obligationsbegriff, I, (1927) Uppsala—Leipzig, pp. 259-; EHRHARDT, 
ARNOLD, Das Corpus Christi und die Korporationen im spät-römischen Recht,  SZ 70 (1953) pp. 
308-. 
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the works of Plato and Aristotle.14 In Plato’s dialogue titled Sophist, the essence of 
dialectics is formulated as follows: 15 
 
 
Stranger: Should we not say that the division according to classes, which 




The aim of the dialectical method is to formulate general propositions (regulae, 
principia)17 or respectively, to draw up definitions (definitiones).18 This purpose was 
sought to be achieved by the division of concepts and legal phenomena to genus and 
species and the definition of species and specimens. The novelty of the method stood 
basically in hierarchical systematization.19 
 
 
                                                          
14 See Aristotelés, Topica VII; eo., Analytica posteriora II. 
15 SCHULZ, FRITZ, Geschichte der römischen Rechtswissenschaft, (1961) Weimar, p. 73, and PÓLAY, 
ELEMÉR, A római jogászok gondolkodásmódja, Kazuisztika és absztrakció, [The Thinking of the 
Roman Lawyers, Casuistic and Abstraction] (1988) Budapest, p. 96. 
16 Platon, Sophistés 253 D-E. 
17 The deductive method is emphasized by LEIBNIZ in his work Nova methodus discendae 
docendaeque iurisprudentiae. See STEIN, PETER, Roman Law in European History, (1999) 
Cambridge, p. 140. Further NÖRR, cit. p. 58. 
18 PÓLAY, cit. p. 44. KRÜGER, SCHULZ, STEIN, HAUSMANINGER take the terms ’regula’ and 
’definitio’ as equivalent. See PÓLAY, cit. p. 73. 
19 See BÜRGE, ALFONS, Römisches Privatrecht. Rechtsdenken und gesellschaftliche Verankerung. 
Eine Einführung, (1999) Darmstadt, pp. 104-106. 
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By means of the dialectical epistemology, genera might be identified in two 
ways: either by differentiation: διαίresις (diairesis, differentia in Latin) or by the 
synthesis of the diversity: σyναγóγή (synagógé).20 
 
 
For the latter, diairesis, an example can be found at a passage of the praetorian 
edictum addressing the possibilities of restoration to original condition in case of 
persons above the age of twenty-five.21 The source of law issued by the magistrate 
states that the praetor shall help all those who were away on behalf of the public 
interest and due to this reason, were unable to enforce or protect their rights. After 
pronouncing the basic proposition, the text continues with the examination of 
individual cases as to whether they fall within the general category of absence on 
behalf of the public interest. 
 
 
The other possibility of determining genera is the method of differentiation or 
distinction22, which was used to be applied in many disciplines such as linguistics, 
rhetoric23, or literary theory.24 
 
 
The method of distinction appears in many of the works of legal scholars as 
well.25 The derivation of general rules by distinction is well illustrated in a 
                                                          
20 Platon, Sophistes 253 D 
21 D. 4, 6 
22 The term ’distinctio’ was in use by the glossators. See STEIN,  cit.  p. 65. 
23 Cicero, Ad Herennium 1, 4, 6; 1, 8, 12; 1, 2, 2. 
24 Diogenes Laёrtius 3, 45-66. 
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Papinianus-fragment which connects a responsum (operarum actio […] apud 
heredem manebit) given to an individual case (si patroni filius extrario restituerit ex 
trebelliano hereditatem)26 with a more general principle (non summoveri heredem 




The concept of distinction understood in a wider sense can be further divided 
into two subcategories: partition and divisio28, meaning also διαίrεsις in a narrower 
sense29.The technical approach towards these two subcategories, divisio and 
partitio30, can be traced back to a rhetorical writing: Cicero’s Topica.31 
 
 
Divisio refers to the division of genus into species. In this case the division is 
complete, the totality of the parts equal to the whole since under all genera only a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
25 G. 1, 188 and Paul. D. 41, 2, 3, 23. Further BREMER 1, 263. In a fragment of Messala 
„Patriciorum auspicia in duas sunt divisa potestates.” For the triads see GOUDY, HENRY, 
Trichotomy in Roman Law, (1910) Oxford 
26 Pap. D. 36, 1, 57 pr. 
27 For further examples see SCHULZ,  cit. pp. 78-79. 
28 According to PÓLAY there was a third definition, the so called quid est definition. See PÓLAY, cit. 
p.112. 
29 Cicero, Topica, 5, 28, and NÖRR, cit. p. 20. 
30 The term partitio is used here as a possible form of creation of definitions and not as a type of 
legates. For the second see KASER, MAX, Das römische Privatrecht, I, Das altrömische, das 
vorklassische und das klassische Recht, 2nd ed. (1971) München, pp. 742-743. 
31 The lawyers borrowed very likely their terminology from rhetors and philosophers. For an 
example see BRÓSZ, RÓBERT, Die Rolle der Gewohnheit (des Gewohnheitsrechts) im Laufe der 
Entfaltung und Entwickelung der longi temporis praescriptio(nes), (1985) Szeged, p. 142; and 
GUARINO, ANTONIO, L’esegesi delle fonti del diritto romano, I, (1982) Napoli, p. 540. 
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specific number of species can be drawn. With respect to partitio, the whole is being 
divided into its members (membra) where the distinction is complete if the object to 
be divided is a finite one, a res finita. The main difference between the two is that in 
the case of divisio the number of the parts cannot be increased whereas with respect 
to partitio, it is possible to insert new components (such as in the modern Pandecta-
system). In addition, it is much more partitio than divisio that corresponds to the 
criteria of contemporary theory of science since only partitio can secure the self-
contained character of the system, the absence of legal loopholes.32 Nevertheless, 
divisio is still greatly prevalent in the particular streams of legal scholarship, which is 
a fact reflecting well the eternal weaknesses of jurisprudence which can never be 
overcome in comparison to more exact disciplines.33 
 
 
The concepts of divisio and partitio and the schemes of categorization based 
upon them were not used consistently even in the terminology of Roman law.34 This 
can be proved by the fact that in the text used for the establishment of a type of 
legacy, namely, partitio legata, the words partitor and dividito appear as synonyms.35 
 
 
                                                          
32 From the problematic of the whole-parts systematisation other, more actual questions can be 
drawn. The European integration process is based on the building a whole from parts, turning back 
the classical partitio. See NÖRR, DIETER, Divisio et partitio: Bemerkungen zur römischen 
Rechtsquellenlehre und zur antiken Wissenschaftstheorie, (1972) Berlin, p. 58-. 
33 NÖRR, cit. p. 58. 
34 The development of certain terms was deeply influenced by politics, as well. For the example of 
patrocinium see DIÓSDI, GYÖRGY, A patrocinium egyes kérdései az egyiptomi papiruszok alapján, 
(1963) Budapest, p. 186. 
35 UE 24, 25: „Heres meus cum Titio hereditatem meam pertitor”. See also KASER, cit. p. 74536. 
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Sicut singulae res legari possunt, ita universarum quoque summa legari potest, 
ut puta hoc modo: „heres meus cum titio hereditatem meam partito, dividito”; quo 
casu dimidia pars bonorum legata videtur: potest autem et alia pars, velut tertia vel 
quarta, legari. Quae species „partitio”....36 
 
 
Nevertheless, the concepts of divisio and partitio do not nearly exhaust the 
possibilities of grouping and definition-constitution. Besides the procedures 
mentioned above, according to the ancient sources but also with general dogmatic 
applicability it can be assumed that the division of the appellation (όνομα) into its 
meanings (σημαινόμενα) and the genus into its singular components were used as 
well.37 To the latter a plausible and legally relevant example is given by the names of 
persons. Names in Roman law were much more direct reflections of the fact that a 
specific person belongs to a certain gens. The gens determined the person’s nomen 
genticulum while the praenomen and the cognomen ensured the further concretization 
of his or her identity.38 
 
 
From the above-stated it appears that the subject-matter of general clauses can 
be delineated by means of divisio since they contain discrete norms specified by their 
                                                          
36 The end of the fragment is dubious. For a parallel source see Gai. 2, 254: „quae species ‘partitio’ 
legati vocatur. See FIRA III Nr. 70; Iav. D. 28, 6, 39 pr.; Lab. D. 32, 29, 1; Cicero, De legibus 2, 
50; id., Pro Cluentio 7, 21; id., Pro Caecia 4, 12. 
37 TALAMANCA, MARIO, Lo schema ’genus—species’ nelle sistematiche dei giuristi romani, in: 
Problemi attuali di scienza e di cultura. Accademia nazionale dei Lincei, Quaderno 221, II, (1977) 
Roma, p. 97. 
38 VISKY, KÁROLY, Személynevek a római jog világában, [Personal Names in the World of Roman 
Law] (1981) Budapest, pp. 192-193. 
 58
www.ridrom.uclm.es  Abril - 2009 




III. The relationship between the whole and the part 
 
 
The relationship between the whole and the part appears to be unambiguous; 
nevertheless, it suffered a great crisis during the ‘30s of the last century. That was the 
era of the subsequent emergence of revolutionary discoveries in quantum mechanics, 
which fundamentally changed the ideas of the modern man about the nature of the 
part and the whole.  
 
 
The relativity of the relationship of the whole and the part – although without 
much consciousness about it - had been present in the field of law for a long time39, 
albeit Paulus formulated the following, at first sight logically not objectionable rule 
as a regula: in eo, quod plus sit semper inest et minus.40 
 
                                                          
39 The servitutes can be also seen from the aspect of the whole-parts problematic. Are they 
separated from the proprietas or can be regarded as immanent rights? See DONELLUS, HUGO, 
Donelli iurisconsulti commentaria de iure civili, I, (1589) Francofurti, pp. 426-, and VANGEROW, 
KARL ADOLF VON, Lehrbuch der Pandekten, 7th ed., I, (1863) Marburg—Leipzig, pp. 687-688. For 
more concise literature see DIÓSDI, GYÖRGY, A telki szolgalmak és a zálogjog keletkezéséről a 
római jogban, [On the Origin of Mortgage and Rural Servitutes in the Roman Law] (1966) 
Budapest, pp. 91-93; FÖLDI ANDRÁS: Adalékok a „tulajdonjogi triász” kérdéséhez, [Contribution to 
the Question of the Triad in the property Law] Acta Fac. Pol.-iur. Univ. Budapest 42 (2005), pp. 30-
. There is also an interesting addition in the Holy Script, see Cor. 1, 13, 10. 
40 Paul. D. 50, 17, 110 pr. 
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Contrary to this rule of general applicability, Roman legal scholars already in 




- Can the part be greater than the 
whole? 
- Can the part be more expensive 
than the whole? 
 
 
And to the following questions, the answer would be definitely negative: 
 
 
- Does the sum of the parts always 
equal to the whole? Or vice versa: is the whole always the totality of the parts? 




From the posterior answers it is obvious that the legal concept of the part is a 
greatly confuse, sui generis phenomenon, which may contradict the requirements of 
formal logic and our everyday concepts. 
 
 
In order to clarify the paradox stated above, I seek to isolate three different 
meanings of the concept of the part in the legal order, and respectively, in legal 
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scholarship. The first is the strict part, which refers to a concept of the part which is 
based on arithmetic proportions. The second is the fictive part, which cannot be 
encountered in the empirical reality; its separate existence is constituted and regulated 
by legal norms. The third is the extensive part, which, breaking out from the given 
frameworks, formatively affects the whole to which it belongs. 
 
 
The different conceptions of the part entail different problems to which 




III. 1. The strict part 
 
 
Lawyers may address the concept of the part in a strict or arithmetic, in other 
words in a normative sense. This is the case when the lawyer determines the 
compulsory portion of a person who cannot be ignored in material terms to be the 
quarter of his or her legal portion of inheritance. This is also the case when the lawyer 
calculates the parts of divisible goods41 or in case of an instalment payment counts 
out the current portion of the amount to be paid. Also, it falls within this category to 
count out the interest to be paid after the capital (for instance, Romans used the one-
twelfth of the capital as a point of reference42)43 but also the same applies to the case 
                                                          
41 There was no categorisation for divisible and indivisible things. See BRÓSZ, RÓBERT, Az 
„osztható” és „oszthatatlan” dolgok fogalma a római jogban, [The Term of the Divisible and 
Indivisible Things in the Roman Law] Acta Fac. Pol.-iur. Univ. Budapest 8 (1966), p. 9. 
42 „XII tabulis sanctum, ne quis unciario fenore amplius exerceret.” See Tacitus, Annales, 6, 16. 
The uncia was the one twelweth of the as. The Romans gave .an own name for each proportion. See 
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when the finder’s award is determined after the value of the treasure44. In addition, 
also the scholarly categorization of the legal order, a branch of law or other 
phenomena (for example that of natural persons) pertains to this issue-area. 
 
 
To the arithmetic utilization of the strict part or the whole-part relationship and 
the correction of the result achieved by this method, an interesting example is 
provided by the lex Fufia Caminia enacted in 2 BC, which regulated the liberation of 
slaves and hereby restricted testamentary freedom. According to its provisions, only a 
specific proportion of slaves could be freed testamentarily. These proportions were 
determined contrary to the fact that the achieved results were contradictory. Pursuant 
to Gaius, the lex did not affect domini possessing only one or two slaves (ad hanc 
legem non pertinet)45. Ulpianius did not even refer to those slave-holders.46 As a 
result, both of them started the discussion with reference to domini possessing at least 
three slaves. In Ulpianus’s account, the marginal numbers are specified inconsistently 
since they are added up to both volumes. This could be carried out without significant 
consequences since these marginal numbers in many cases could not be divided by 
the new proportion by which it was made clear that the volumes were not closed.47  
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
MARTON, GÉZA, A római magánjog elemeinek tankönyve. Institúciók, [A Study-Book of the 
Institutions of Roman Private Law] 4th ed., (1937) Debrecen, pp. 199-2001. 
43 The partitio legata was a special kind of division. See Pomp. D. 30, 26, 2; Gai. 2, 257; UE 25, 
15; Theoph. 2, 23, 5. 
44 A deeper analysis is given by VISKY, KÁROLY, Kincs és kincstalálás, [Treasure and Treasure-
trove] JK 37 (1982), pp. 25-29. For the antic regulations see I. 2, 1, 39 and C. 10, 15, 1. 
45 Gai. 1, 43 
46 UE 1, 24 
47 This lex was reconstructed on a different way by BESSENYŐ, ANDRÁS, Római magánjog I. A 
római magánjog az európai jogi gondolkodás tükrében, [Roman Private Law] 2nd ed., (2000) 
Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest—Pécs, p. 224. 
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The content of the lex can be reproduced as follows: the testator having three 
slaves could free only two of them whereas in case of four to ten slaves maximum the 
half of them could be liberated. With respect to slaves the number of varying from 
ten to thirty, the regulation allowed for the liberation only of the one-third; in case of 
thirty to one-hundred slaves, the one-fourth could be freed. Between a hundred and 
five-hundred slaves the permissible proportion that could be liberated in the testament 
was one-fifth, although the number of slaves freed testamentarily could not exceed 
one-hundred. The regulation held to these marginal numbers and the steadily 
increasing proportions despite the fact that they lead to mathematical contradictions. 
For instance, in arithmetic terms the slave-holder who possessed twelve slaves could 
have freed four of them in opposition to the slave-holder in the possession of ten 
slaves in which case even five of them could be liberated. Due to these 
contradictions, Gaius and Ulpianus were compelled to give an explanation: if the 
number of slaves calculated upon the proportion prescribed by the law do not reach 
the maximum of the number of slaves that can be liberated in the prior volume, then 
this maximum will be authoritative as long as it is not exceeded by the new 
proportion of the new volume.48 
 
 
To illustrate the interpretational differences, moreover, difficulties created by 
this arithmetical obscurity in course of time, it is sufficient to review the sources 
conveying the lex Fufia Caminia, which exhibit remarkable differences if compared 
to each other: 
 
 
                                                          
48 See PS 4, 14, 4 
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It is very likely that that the ratio legis had been the stabilization of the rapidly 
decreasing number of slaves. The princeps who was standing behind the legislative 
organ, by virtue of the respect towards property, decided to regulate only the mortis 
causa liberations and left the other kinds of manumissions intact. Probably the 
                                                          
49 Gai. 1, 42-46. The 12th page of the Codex Veronensis can not be read. The interpretation of the 
act was completed by HUSCHKE on the basis of Gai. Epitome 2 pr. See HUSCHKE, PHILIPP EDUARD, 
Gaii institutionum iuris civilis commentarii quattuor, in: Iurisprudentiae Anteiustinianae quae 
supersunt, 5th ed., (1885) Leipzig. 
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princeps’s reason to intervention was based on the already existing practice of 
regulation in different proportions with respect to the field of mortis causa legal 
transactions.50 (For this matter, it is sufficient to think of the proportions introduced 
by the lex Falcidia in 40 BC.) Thus, the princeps kept to the different proportions in 
this case as well for the sake of the legitimacy of the act, despite the fact that the 
sequence produced in this way was contradictory in terms of mathematics and 
owning to this, it had to be corrected in each step. That strict parts were, indeed, 
arbitrary from the perspective of law is well supported by the fact that Justinianus had 
repealed the act51 in question. Although the justification of the repeal argues on 
behalf of humanity, nevertheless, Justinianus’s decision may have been influenced by 
the unreasonableness of the provisions as contained by the lex Fufia Caminia as well.  
 
 
III.2 The fictive part 
 
 
The direct opposite of the division into strict parts is the second case, where the 
part does not even exist tangibly. In this case lawyers mean a fictive, ostensible part 
under the concept of the part, for example this is the case with respect to 
condominium or collective ownership when the proportions of the co-owners are 
referred to as pro parte – pro indiviso proportions.52 Even though the proportions of 
the co-owners physically extend to the whole of the object, still, arithmetically, it can 
be defined only in terms of one specific proportion.53 
                                                          
50 This analogy is emphasized by GUARINO as well. See GUARINO, ANTONIO, Diritto privato 
romano, 9th ed., (1992) Napoli, p. 686. 
51 I. 1, 7 
52 Q. Muc.-Paul. D. 50, 16, 25, 1; Cels.-Ulp. D. 13, 6, 5, 15; Ulp. D. 45, 3, 5; Seneca, De beneficiis 
7, 12. 
53 See KASER, cit. p. 411. 
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In the second case when fictive parts are applied, it is not the fact of using 
specific, mathematic proportions but rather the absence of such proportions, which 
leads or had lead to difficulties. For example, the reasonable legal judgement54 of the 
public weal, which can be viewed as the property of the whole community and not of 
single citizens, had been a difficult issue already in the ancient times. Concerning the 
use of certain, jointly used objects, such as baths, halls or squares, the individual 
responsibility for damages was in solidum, which means that it extended to the total 
amount of the damage.55 
 
 
There is another case which can be explained specifically by referring to the 
antique social relations. It concerned the initiation of a noxal action against one of the 
owners of the slave which was the object of collective ownership. In this situation 
arose the question that whether the owner, who has only a pro parte and, naturally, 
pro indiviso proportion with respect to the slave, shall pay compensation to the co-
owners in case of giving up the slave in noxa or not.56 
 
 
The judicial adjudicatio determining the case of disputed plot-borders might 
well be for the benefit of more co-owners (where the ostensible controversy is solved 
by Paulus by means of attaching the borders more to the plots than to the persons) but 
when the plot is owned by the co-owners pro indiviso, the adjudicated part of the plot 
                                                          
54 Marc. D. 1, 8, 6, 1 
55 Ulp. D. 13, 6, 5, 15 
56 Gai. D. 2, 9, 4 
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cannot be divided among them57. Thus, their fictive part of the collective property 
cannot materialize physically, not even with respect to increment. 
 
 
The distinctive characteristics of the fictive part are made absolutely clear in 
the case when two carts are rented or loaned for use by two persons. How can the 
responsibility be divided between these two persons in this case? It is obvious that 
both of them cannot use both carts at the same time and it cannot be stated as well 
that one of them would be responsible only for one of the carts and so the other. In 




III.3. The “extensive” part 
 
 
Third, the legal order also includes the concept of the part in an extensive 
sense, for example in the case of more valuable accessory things. 
 
 
According to an Ulpianus-fragment, the pictures painted to the panels of the 




                                                          
57 Paul. D. 10, 1, 4, 5-6 
58 Ulp. D. 13, 6, 5, 15 
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An interesting problem arises when the costumer intends to buy the real estate 
only because of these ornaments. In this case the accessory - the painting or the 
marble carving - is of greater significance from the perspective of the customer’s 
intention than the main object, the house. The part outgrows the whole in its 
importance; however, since the house being the main object incorporates the 
accessories as well, it is the house which will significantly determine the accessories’ 
legal position.60 Therefore, a contract of sale made with respect to the house will be 
valid independently of the fact that the value of the accessory ornaments may 
remarkably exceed the value of the house: 
 
 
nec refert, quanti sit accessio, sive plus in ea sit quam in ipsa re cui accedat an 
minus: plerasque enim res aliquando propter accessiones emimus, sicuti cum domus 
propter marmora et statuas et tabulas pictas ematur.61 
                                                          
59 Ulp. D. 19, 1, 17, 3 
60 Ulp. D. 19, 1, 17, 3 és Cels. D. 6, 1, 38. See PÓLAY, ELEMÉR, A személyhez kapcsolódó egyes 
eszmei javak magánjogi védelmének nyomai a római jogban, [The Marks of the Protection of 
Certain Personal Rights in the Roman Civil Law] JK XLII (1987)/3, 151, and VISKY, KÁROLY: 
Festők, szobrászok és alkotásaik a római jog tükrében, [Painters, Sculptors and Their Products in 
the Mirror of Roman Law] AT 1968 XV 2, 19526. See also BONFANTE, PIETRO, Corso di diritto 
romano. La proprietà, II, (1996) Milano, p. 84, and CALABI LIMENTANI, IDA, Studi sulla società 
romana: il lavoro artistico, (1957) Milano, p. 119. Cited by VISKY, cit. 19526. 
61 Paul. D. 18, 1, 34 pr. PÓLAY, ELEMÉR, A személyiség polgári jogi védelmének történetéhez. 
Iniuria-tényállások a római jogban, [To the History of the Protection of Personality in Civil Law] 
AUSz 30 (1983) 
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The condition included in a legal transaction can be seen as an extensive part as 
well. Although the condicio constitutes a specific, isolated part of the whole of the 
legal transaction, still, it influences the effectiveness of the whole transaction. The 
examination from the perspective of the whole-part relationship leads to new 
observations in this field as well. If the original legal transaction is complemented by 
a condition, despite the identity of the parties, a novatio occurs provided that the 
condition eventuates. If the specified condition does not come about, the original 
transaction remains “valid”.62 Thus, the legal situation is contingent on the 
materialization of the condition: in this situation it is uncertain whether the original 
transaction will perish or not as a result of the novatio. The condicio therefore 
functions as a gate between the original and the new transaction. According to  
contemporary dogmatic findings, the condition is considered to be such a 
circumstance which influences the effectiveness of the legal transaction.63 In the case 
in question, however, it appears that it is rather the validity or the invalidity of the 
legal transaction which is determined by the condition. This statement, of course, 
does not touch upon the soundness of modern validity theories; it only seeks to point 
                                                          
62 Gai. 3, 179 
63 See FÖLDI, ANDRÁS—HAMZA, GÁBOR, A római jog története és institúciói, [The History and 
Institutions of Roman Law ] 13th ed., (2008) Budapest, p. 397, further BENEDEK, FERENC, Római 
magánjog, Dologi és kötelmi jog, 2nd ed., (1995) Pécs, p. 151. More carefully KASER, MAX—
KNÜTEL, ROLF, Römisches Privatrecht, 15th ed., (2005) München, p. 65, and HAUSMANINGER, 
HERBERT—SELB, WALTER, Römisches Privatrecht, 9th ed., (2001) Wien—Köln—Weimar, pp. 
201-202. For diverse view see FLUME, WERNER, Rechtsakt und Rechtsverhältnis, Römische 
Jurisprudenz und modernrechtliches Denken, (1990) Paderborn, pp. 120-. Cited by KNÜTEL—
KASER,  cit. p. 65. 
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to the conceptual and, in part due to this, theoretical confusion concerning the field of 






After having reviewed the different approached in relation to the concept of the 
part, the question rightly arises: under which category do general clauses as parts of a 
legal norm fall? 
 
 
Essentially, general clauses can be conceptualized as such parts (clause) of a 
source of law, which, with certain restrictions as expressed by the “general” attribute, 
may have a determinative influence with respect of the whole of the given source of 
law.65 For example, a contract may become invalid because of the clause on 
fraudulent practices or the bona fide clause may, in certain cases, refine the 
interpretation of many of the norms deriving from the given legal source. Therefore a 
                                                          
64 On the theoretical uncertainty see SIKLÓSI IVÁN: A jogügyleti hatályosság elméleti 
problematikája, különös tekintettel a végrendelet visszavonásának dogmatikai megítélésére, [The 
Theoretical Problem of the Effectiveness of Legal Transactions, with Special Focus on the 
Theoretical Estimation of the Renouncement of Testaments)  Acta Fac. Pol-iur. Univ. Budapest 41 
(2004), p. 74. Roman and modern problems of the condiciones are touched by ZIMMERMANN. See 
ZIMMERMANN, REINHARD, The Law of Obligations, Roman Foundations of the Civilian Tradition, 
(1996) Oxford, pp. 716-741. And TRABUCCHI, ALBERTO, Istitituzioni di diritto civile, 43th ed., 
(2005) Milano, p. 143. At least LARENZ, KARL—WOLF, MANFRED, Allgemeiner Teil des 
Bürgerlichen Rechts, 9th ed., (2004) München, pp. 913-. 
65 The expression ex generali clausula is written by Ulpianus (D. 4, 6, 26, 1) and by his pupil, 
Modestinus (D. 4, 6, 33 pr.). 
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legal proposition can be classified as a general clause if, as elaborated above, it stands 
in an extensive relationship with the whole. 
 
 
The most important consequence of this result is that a specific general clause 
can only be interpreted in each case by considering the whole of the given source of 
law.66 If at first sight substantially identical general clauses of different legal orders 
are subjected to a comparative analysis, it may lead to a false conclusion if we ignore 
the context in which they are embedded. Thus, general clauses are system-dependent. 
 
 
III. The relationship of genus-species 
 
 
The other component of the expression “general clause”, the “general” attribute 
directs attention to the genus-species relationship. In the next sections I will seek to 
review the general philosophic and legal problems raised by these categories, and 
then, I will attempt to discuss the relationship of the genus-species and the whole-part 
conceptual pairs with respect to their potential points of connection. 
 
 
III.1 Philosophical problems raised by the genus-species relationship 
 
 
In course of the legal analysis of the essentially philosophical categories of 
genus and species, it is worth mentioning the philosophical findings related to them. 
                                                          
66 See SCHMIDT, RICHARD, Allgemeine Staatslehre, I, (1901) Leipzig, pp.170-171. Cited by MOÓR, 
cit. p. 9. 
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Although the invocation of philosophy in the process of the application of law is a 
controversial issue67, nevertheless, in certain cases already Roman legal scholars 
referred to philosophers in their decisions68. In addition, the two disciplines intersect 
at several points with respect to their subject-matters69 and also, it is beyond doubt 
that philosophy as a discipline has impacted in many aspects on Roman jurisprudence 
and by its transmission, on universal legal scholarship as well.70 
 
 
The genus is a more general concept occupying a higher systemic level, which 
clasps the subordinate concepts but may become a building block of a higher genus 
as well.71 This taxonomic relativity is also expressed within the field of 
jurisprudence. Roman lawyers who occupied themselves with pragmatic issues had 
not dealt with the definition of the ultimate starting point so their categorizations with 
                                                          
67 WINKEL, LAURENS: Le droit romain et la philosophie grecque. Quelques problèmes de méthode, 
TR 1977 (65) 377. 
68 Alf. D. 5, 1, 76; Marc. D. 1, 3, 2; D. 21, 1, 18 pr 
69 Gellius, Noctes Atticae X, 22, 1-2. 
70 The dispute on the relationship between philosophy and law has its origin by Ulpianus in D. 1, 1, 
1, 1. On this question see MAYER-MALY: „Jurisprudenz ist mehr als Rechtsanwendung; praktische 
und wirkliche Philosophie”. See MAYER-MALY, THEO, Recht und Philosophie, in: EBERT, KURT 
(Hrsg.), Festschrift Hermann Baltl zum 60. Geburtstag dargebracht von Fachkollegen und 
Freunden (Forschungen zur Rechts- und Kulturgeschichte 11), (1978) Innsbruck, pp. 327-348. 
Cited by WINKEL,cit. p. 379. According to WALDSTEIN: „Ulpianus deutet darauf hin, dass seit 
Plato und Aristoteles Sophistik (Scheinweisheit) und Philosophie einander gegenüberstehen.” See 
WALDSTEIN, WOLFGANG: Römische Rechtswissenschaft und wahre Philosophie, Index 22 (1994) 
pp. 31-45. 
71 PRECHTL, PETER—BURKARD, FRANZ-PETER, Metzler Philosophie Lexikon, Begriffe und 
Definitionen, (1999) Stuttgart—Weimar, s. v. Gattung. 
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respect to genus are valid only within the given context.72 Owning to this, the genus 
and species expressions appear in the available sources as such synonyms which are 
mutually interchangeable. An illustrative example is given to this phenomenon by 
Gaius’s classification73 of obligations where species appears as a superior category in 
comparison to genus. This relativity is a characteristic of contemporary legal 
scholarship as well.74 
 
 
Abstraction reaching to increasingly higher levels leads finally to the highest 
genus (genus summum)75, to the supreme existent76. The genus is therefore inherent 
in the specific species, which partake in its general essence and thus, represent more 
general common features77. At this very point of partaking can be grasped the 
intersection of the genus-species and the whole-part problems. Theoretically it can be 
justified when comparing specimens that the tertium comparationis will be system-
                                                          
72 This method is not scientific. The „ (…)Importance of formulating precise questions and of 
choosing one’s standing point” emphasized by RAZ, JOSEPH, The Problem about the Nature of Law, 
in: FLØISTAD, GUTTORM, Contemporary Philosophy, A New Survey, III, (1982) London, p. 107. 
73 Gai. 3, 88-89 
74 The classification is always occasional:  bloss willkürlich; jeweils nur relativ zu einem 
bestimmten Gesichtspunkt. See HÜGLI, ANTON—LÜBCKE, POUL, Philosophielexikon, (1997) 
Hamburg, s. v. Gattung. „Merely conventional; essential to thought” – stated by MACGREGOR. See 
MACGREGOR, GEDDES: Dictionary of Religion and Philosophy, (1989) New York, s. v. genus. 
75 „Itself not serving as a species.” See BLACKBURN, SIMON: The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 
(1994) Oxford, s. v. genus. 
76 EISLER, RUDOLF, cit. s. v. Gattung 
77 „Class of things that share a common nature”. See BUNNIN, NICHOLAS—YU, JIYUAN, The 
Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy, (2004) Malden—Oxford—Carlton, s. v. genus. Ont he 
philosophical background of modern legal reasoning see MAUTHER, THOMAS, A Dictionary of 
Philosophy, (1996) Oxford—Cambridge, s. v. genus. „Class of things that share a common nature” 
. 
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dependent, which means that it will depend on the genus, on the superior category 
which is placed above the specimen to be compared within specific systems.78 
Specimen may exhibit their specific characteristics only in their relation to the given 
genus. The comparison is made somewhat more difficult by the fact that specimen 
may differ in secondary, not genus-specific characteristics.79  
 
 
The question arises whether it is possible to assume a superior genus above 
general clauses or general clauses occupy the top-level of the taxonomic pyramid as a 
kind of universalia of law? It appears that the answer to the latter question is 
negative: for example for Roman legal scholars, equity (aequitas) served as a 
superior category.80 The praetor gave assistance to the absent person by invoking a 
                                                          
78 IANNONE, PABLO A., Dictionary of World Philosophy, (2001) London—New York, p. 143, 
valamint KLAUS, GEORG—BUHR, MANFRED (Hrsg.), Philosphisches Wörterbuch, (1975) Leipzig, s. 
v. Gattung. The same thesis can be found by HEGEL, as WINDELBAND stated it: „[Der Begriff] erst 
im Zusammenhange mit den übrigen und durch die Art seiner Einfügung in das Ganze seinen 
wahren Wert erhält.” See WINDELBAND, WILHELM, Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Philosophie, 14th 
ed., (1948) Tübingen, p. 517. And VORLÄNDER, KARL: Geschichte der Philosophie, (1932) 
Berlin—Charlottenburg, p. 399: „Jede Erscheinung deutet vermöge ihrer Eingegrenztheit 
notwendigerweise über sich selbst hinaus”. Important difference, however, that HEGEL regards 
history as a continual process, which realises itself in time. In contradiction, the time does not play 
here an important role. Acording to HEGEL there is no such a thing as time, it is only a delusive 
phenomenon of the restricted perception of us. See RUSSEL, BERTRAND, History of Western 
Philosophy, (2002) London, p. 705. 
79 SCHMIDT, HEINRICH, Philosophisches Wörterbuch, (1982) Stuttgart, s. v. Gattung. And RUSSEL, 
cit. p. 447. 
80 The hidden set of values in the constitution are regarded by SÓLYOM  as being prior to the general 
clauses. See SÓLYOM, LÁSZLÓ, Alkotmányértelmezés az új alkotmánybíróságok gyakorlatában, 
[Interpretation of the Constitution in the Praxis of the Constitutional Courts] in: VIZI E. 
SZILVESZTER (szerk.): Székfoglalók 2001, Társadalomtudományok, [Inaugural Lectures 2001, 
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general clause (which in the present case refers to the first known general clause in 
universal legal history) because his aequissimum erat subveniri81 intervention was 
considered to be equitable. Thus, the general clause was applied only for the sake of 
the superior principle of equity. 
 
 
Genera cannot be thought of as concrete existents, they can be observed only 
with respect to single individuals.82 Within the concept of the general clause, 
however, the Aristotelian categories of substantial (to ti en einai) and collective 
concepts (katholon) merge. Although general clauses substantially qualify as genera 
(as indicated by their denomination as well), formally, they are endowed with an 
autonomous presence as sources of law. In addition, their legal content unfolds fully 
in specific cases in the course of the application of law. 
 
 
The deduction83 inherent in the philosophical approach as elaborated above is 
in direct opposition with the essentially inductive method applied by Roman legal 
scholars. It comes by no surprise, however, that the case-based Roman legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
Social Sciences] (2005) Budapest, p. 467. And NOWAK, CARSTEN, Die praktische Bedeutung der 
Generalklauseln und unbestimmten Rechtsbegriffen in den grossen Kodifikationen der Deutschen 
Demokratischen Republik, (1993) Köln, p. 5. 
81 Ulp. D. 4, 6, 21, 2  
82 „Sie [ scil. die Gattungen] begreifen all dies Besondere unter sich, sie gelten dafür.” See 
WINDELBAND, WILHELM, Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, I,  p. 59. Cited by 
EISLER, RUDOLF, cit. p. 456. And HONDERICH, TED (ed.), The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
(1995) Oxford—New York, s. v. species. This thesis was heavily attacked by the realists, see 
HÜGLI, ANTON—LÜBCKE, POUL, cit. p. 232. 
83 According to STOCKHAMMER we can establish the genus only in deductive way. See 
STOCKHAMMER, MORRIS, Philosophisches Wörterbuch, (1980) Essen, s. v. Gattung. 
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scholarship reached its peak of evolution when the discrete decisions were delivered 
with moderate consideration of the basic propositions of Greek philosophy as well.84 
This observation is valid despite the fact that the classic era of Roman jurisprudence 
coincided with a rather obscure period of Greek philosophy.85 Later on, the regulas 
summarized in the last title86 of the Digesta signified the beginning of a new, 
deductive approach87, which reached one of its zeniths by the established application 




III.2. The genus-species relationship as a problem in jurisprudence 
 
 
Among the numerous88 methods of scientific definition-building, the method of 
genus proximum aims at locating the proximate superior genus.89 Characteristically, 
those Roman legal scholars (such as Pomponius or Gaius) dealt with the genus-
                                                          
84 See KUNKEL, WOLFGANG—SCHERMEIER, MARTIN, Römische Rechtsgeschichte, 13th ed., (2001) 
Köln—Weimar—Wien, p. 140, and WINKEL: cit. pp. 373-384. 
85 See WINKEL, cit. pp. 373-384. 
86 D. 50, 17 
87 STEIN, PETER, Regulae iuris, (1966) Edinburgh; SCHMIDLIN, BRUNO, Die römische Rechtsregeln, 
(1970) Köln—Graz, 1970; id., Horoi, pithana und regulae, Zum Einfluß der Rhetorik und Dialektik 
auf die juristische Regelbildung, ANRW II. 15, (1976) Berlin—New York, pp. 101-129; id., 
Regulae iuris, Standard, Norm oder Spruchregel, in: Festschrift Max Kaser, (1976) München, pp. 
91-119. NÖRR, DIETER, Spruchregel und Generalisierung, SZ 90 (1972), pp. 18-93. 
88 There are sixteen different methods of definition according to IANNONE. See IANNONE, PABLO A., 
cit. p. 143. In the Middle Ages the genus—species was one among the praedicabilia, ie. quinque 
voces (genus, species, differentia, proprium, accident). Aristotel, Topica IV, 101 b 17-25: horos, 
genos, diaphora, idion, sumbebekos.  Porphyrius and later BOЁTHIUS changed the horos for species. 
89 AUDI, ROBERT, The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, (1995) Cambridge, s. v. genus. 
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species problem more extensively, who attempted to systematize the casuistically 
worked-out legal material and to define the related concepts. These scholars had to 
apply this philosophical-theoretical conceptual pair to empirical, lifelike materials. 
 
 
The word genus and its declinations appear as definite instruments for system-
building in the school-book of Gaius90, which, compared to other available sources, 
exhibits such didactic values as a perspicuous structure and clear definitions.91 Each 
thematic part of Gaius’s book starts with introductory sections and contains a great 
number of clearly presented concluding references. One of these multi-tiered 
structures can be found in the part dealing with the legal position of persons. In the 
fragment92 in question Gaius introduces systemic shifts with the polysemantic word 
rursus and establishes a deeply-articulated, four-tiered scheme: persons are either free 
or slaves. If they are free, they have either born free or are liberated. Within the latter 
category they may be Roman citizens, persons with Latin Rights or dediticii. The 
word genus is only used in case of the third category referring to liberated persons: 
libertinorum tria sunt genera93. This may be so because of the need to divide the 
upper category into more than two parts for the first time, however, it can be well 
demonstrated as well that the employment of the noun genus for definition had not 
been attached strictly to a specific systemic level: it functioned only as an occasional 
means for more sophisticated language-usage. 
 
 
                                                          
90LARENZ, KARL—CANARIS, CLAUS-WILHELM, Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft, 3rd ed., 
(1995) Berlin—Heidelberg, p. 263. 
91 MANTHE, ULRICH (Hrsg.), Gaius Institutiones. Die Institutionen des Gaius, (2004) Darmstadt, p. 
21. 
92 Gai. 1, 9. 
93 Gai. 1, 9 
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The systemic relativity of general clauses as illustrated above can be of great 
significance in the comparison of general clauses of different legal orders.  
 
 




Since the whole-part and the genus-species relationships appear together in the 
expression of “general clause”, it requires further examination to define their 
relationship more precisely. The primary task in this case shall be to clarify whether 
there is a substantial difference between genus and totus on the one hand and pars 
and species on the other in order to examine if it is possible at all to talk about their 
interconnectedness or rather they should be handled as synonyms. 
 
 
Already Cicero had pointed out that the part and the species shall not be 
replaced by one another.94 The most convincing theoretical argument was actually 
presented by BOETHIUS by pointing to the following correspondence: if the genus 
perishes, so do the species; however, if only the species perish, the genus may 
subsist. With respect to the whole and the part, the situation is reversed. If the whole 
perishes, the parts can still maintain their existence whereas with the ruination of the 
parts, the whole vanishes as well. The whole and the genus are clearly marked off in 
the works of SPINOZA as well, who concludes in the course of his investigations of 
the divine nature that to a specific genus only separate parts of the same species may 
                                                          
94 Cicero, Topica 7, 31. Cicero itself confused the two categories. See Cicero, Orator 33, 117). 
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belong in opposition to the whole, which consists of parts belonging to different 
species and is constituted by their fusion. 95 
 
 
The following three cases are the most relevant with respect to the possible 
interconnections of the two category-pairs:96 
 
 
1. from same specied parts emerges a whole which belongs to the 
same species as well 
2. from different specied parts emerges a whole which belongs to 
either of the species of the constituent parts 
3. from different specied parts a whole comes into existence which 
belongs to a new, distinct species 
 
 




tria autem genera sunt corporum, unum, quod continetur uno spiritu et Graece 
ήνωμένον  vocatur, ut homo tignum lapis et similia: alterum, quod ex contingentibus, 
hoc est pluribus inter se cohaerentibus constat, quod συνημμένον vocatur, ut 
                                                          
95 The creations can not belong to the very substance of God, though they unify into one in Him. 
See SPINOZA, BARUCH, Korte Verhandeling van God, de Mensch und deszelfs Welstand, (1677), 1, 
2. 
96 See TALAMANCA, cit. p. 97. 
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aedificium navis armarium: tertium, quod ex distantibus constat, ut corpora plura 








The first category consists of cases where the corpus is homogeneous (or in 
other words it has one soul only - unus spiritus) such as a man98, a timber or a stone. 
Logically, certain agglomerations of things such as corpores ex distantibus fall within 
this category as well. In the case of a corpus ex distantibus the parts are united under 
a common name, such as in the example of a herd or a library. 
 
 
IV. 2. When different specied parts constitute a whole which belongs to 
either of the species 
 
 
To the second category falls the corpus ex contingentibus. In this case the 
different specied parts of the whole constitute a whole belonging to one of the 
different species, such as in the example of a ship or a cupboard. The whole therefore 
mean more than the mere totality of its parts.99 
                                                          
97 Pomp. D. 41, 3, 30 pr.  
98 According to Alfenus Varus the human being is not homogeneous. See D. 5, 1, 76. 
99 See KASER, p. 383. In the case of Saufeius there were diverse categories and answers. See D. 19, 
2, 36. On this problem see BESSENYŐ, ANDRÁS, Das Rätsel der actio oneris aversi: Eine Exegese 
 80
www.ridrom.uclm.es  Abril - 2009 
 
 
In terms of the legal consequences it falls within this category as well the case 
when the contracting parties enter into a contract with respect to a golden bracelet but 
later it turns out that it is made of copper which is only coated with gold. In this 
context one (the gold) part of the constituent parts (gold and copper) determines the 
whole of the legal transaction including the fate of its object (namely that which party 
will the bracelet’s owner be). Although Ulpianus, a legal scholar who investigated 
this matter acknowledged that the parties had been mistaken at the conclusion of the 
contract, he considered the contract to be valid. According to his view, the mistake of 
the parties was not substantial since the material of the bracelet contained some gold 
indeed, therefore their error does not qualify as an essentialis et tolerabilis error. 
Thus, the mistake had several adverse effects: the contract came into existence 
contrary to the obvious interests of the buyer.100 
 
 
IV. 3. When different specied parts constitute a whole which belongs to a 
new, distinct species 
 
 
To the third category in which two different specied parts constitute a new 
specied whole, the most plausible example is provided by the confusion of coequal 
things and the oft closely related aspect of processing (specificatio). The species of 
the things which merge together are decisive in this case as well with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                 
von D. 19, 2, 31, in: Iura antiqua - iura moderna : Festschrift für Ferenc Benedek zum 75. 
Geburtstag, (2001) Pécs, pp. 23-55, and FÖLDI, ANDRÁS: Kereskedelmi jogintézmények a római 
jogban, [Commercial Legal Institutions in Roman Law] (1977) Budapest, pp. 64-67. 
100 Ulp. D. 18, 1, 14 
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legal position of the so-constituted thing. If someone mixes wine with honey, the so 
achieved honey-wine will belong to the mixer’s property. If, however, somebody 
alloys gold with silver, since the alloy of these metals can be dissolved into its 
components again, the owner of any of the parts may rightly claim his or her property 
from the processor.101 
 
 
IV. 4. The effect of temporal changes 
 
 
The legal position of those same specied parts which formerly belonged to a 
certain whole which then fell apart is not without legal significance even after the 
disaggregation. If we entrust somebody with the buying of a collectively owned real 
estate in which the person entrusted is a co-owner, the following question arises: how 
shall the price after the proportion of the real estate be determined which is owned by 
the entrusted person? According to the inventive responsum given to the matter, in 
these cases, for his or her proportion the entrusted is entitled to the average value of 
the prices to be paid after the other parts of the real estate.102  
 
 
The alteration of the parts does not affect the whole or its legal position if the 
altered parts belong to the same species.103 A legion remains the same legion even if 
new soldiers are recruited to fill the ranks of the deceased; the state remains the same 
state as well despite the fact that not the same persons make it up as a hundred years 
                                                          
101 I. 2, 1, 25. For an older view see G. 2, 79. 
102 Ner. D. 17, 1, 35 és Iav. D. 17, 1, 36 pr. The parts are belonging together. See the case of 
derelictio. Mod. D. 41, 7, 3. 
103 In contradiction with KASER, cit. p. 383. Alf. D. 5, 1, 76. 
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ago. The same can be stated about the ship which had been renewed several times 
during the long years of usage, even if none of its planks resemble the original 
vehicle. According to the ancient perception, the human body is constituted by 
atomic particles which are shifting about every day. In this view, human beings as 
biological entities are in a permanent change; still, it cannot be asserted that their 




IV. 5. Summary 
 
 
The clause is a legal norm functioning as a part which accommodates into the 
context of legal regulation, appearing as the whole. In this sense, the clause is one of 
the same kind of parts of this broader regulative environment, which is – as it was 
illustrated above – extensive in nature. With respect to its dogmatic structure, it 
therefore falls within the firstly discussed part of this paper, with one significant 
exception, however. The content of the general clause is in intensive interaction with 
the alteration of the constituent parts of the whole, namely, that of legal norms. For 
instance while the renewed ship as a whole remains identical with its original 
identity, in the case of a codex the paragraphs of which have been abolished or 
modified, the codex itself and, as a result of its natural function, the content of the 
general clauses included in it change as well.104 Nevertheless, certain limitations are 
present: it depends on the logical coherence of the legal system which volitional acts 
of the legislator may become law and this logical coherence can be best captured with 
                                                          
104 See  REBMANN, KURT—SÄCHER, FRANZ JÜRGEN (Hrsg.), Münchener Kommentar zum 
Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch, I, 2nd ed., (1993) München, p. 1140.  
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respect to general clauses by which a certain control is exercised as well.105 In a 
different approach, the real content of the general clause is specified in the process of 
the application of law by the abstraction of more specific legal norms which belong 
to the same regulatory species.  
 
 
This necessarily complex relationship exhibiting two-sided interactions is quite 
favourable from the viewpoint of the effectiveness of law, which is one of the 
ultimate aims of law itself.106 One of the sources of the external stability of the legal 
order is provided by the fact that it can flexibly adapt to the social-legal 
environment.107 General clauses are effective means of this flexibility because they 
secure that legal norms belong to the same species, even in the case of their 
                                                          
105 MOÓR,  cit. p. 7. 
106 „ [… ]Politische Wünsche pozitiv-rechtlich zu untermauern, und damit die bestehende 
Rechtsordnung nicht auf sie selbst zurückzuführenden Belastungen auszusetzen.” See TUREGG, 
KURT EGON VON, Gefährliche und gefährdete Generalklausel. Über die materiell-rechtlichen 
Grenzen der Verwaltunsklagen, (1956) Berlin—Köln, p. 102.  HEDEMANN, JUSTUS WILHELM, Die 
Flucht in die Generalklauseln, Eine Gefahr für Recht und Staat, (1933) Tübingen. The general 
clauses make the critique of the judges easier. See PREUSCHE, REINHARD, Juristische 
Generalklausel und Argumentationspraxis. Die italienische Rechtssprechung zur Anwendbarkeit 
ausländischen Rechts (Ordre Public), (1978) Regensburg, p. 105. FÖLDI, ANDRÁS, A jóhiszeműség 
és tisztesség elve, [The good faith] (2001) Budapest, pp. 43- and 100-; For both the negative and 
positive aspects of the general clauses see ZWEIGERT, KONRAD—KÖTZ, HEIN, Einführung in die 
Rechtsvergleichung, (1996) Tübingen, p. 141. 
107 SAMU MIHÁLY—SZILÁGYI PÉTER, Jogbölcselet, [Theory of Law] (1988) Budapest, p. 247. For 
the example „Mark gleich Mark”  see HEDEMANN, cit. p. 12, and ZWEIGERT, KONRAD—KÖTZ, 
HEIN, Introduction to Comparative Law, (1994) Oxford, p. For further literature on 242.§ BGB see 
BÖRNER, FRITJÖF, Die Bedeutung der Generalklauseln für die Umgestaltung der Rechtsordnung in 
der nationalsozialistischen Zeit, (1989) Frankfurt, pp. 4-6. 
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alteration.108 Thus, with the assistance of general clauses, law will be able to solve 
such problems which had not even emerged at the time of its genesis.109 In 
accordance with the above-stated, general clauses may best secure the long-term 




It is an important fact that the system-dependence of general clauses as 
described above is at least twofold. On the one hand, general clauses depend on the 
inner characteristics of the legal order or a branch of law but at the same time, on the 
other hand, they are immanent accessories of a bigger whole, of the social order as 
well.112 By treating the legal order as a point of reference, the society functions as an 
external factor: not only legal but also moral norms govern the social order impacting 
upon the content of general clauses from an external perspective.113  
 
 
Behind this duality, the duality of law is also present. Within the world view of 
modernity based predominantly on Kantian and Hegelian ideas, law is situated in the 
cross-section of natural world and the world of pure values, in other words, in the 
                                                          
108 See BÖRNER, cit. p. 9. 
109  VARGA, cit. p. 472. 
110 HEDEMANN, cit. p. 209. 
111 MOÓR, cit. p. 12 
112 VARGA, cit. p. 348. 
113 On the immanent morality of law see VARGA, cit. p. 347. The normativ content of the general 
clauses is always in harmony with the social values. See NOWAK, cit. p. 3. 
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field of value-laden reality.114 In accordance with the above-stated, with respect to 
general clauses as legal norms this duality is even more apparent.  
Accordingly, when conducting a comparative analysis of general clauses it is 
very important to reckon with their dual system-dependence, otherwise the 
investigation may easily lead to invalid conclusions since the identification of the real 
content of the clauses could not be carried out.115 
 
 
V. Final Conclusions 
 
 
By virtue of the above schematization it has become more plausible to 
understand the nature of general clauses. The classification would be even more 
reasonable if different legal consequences would be attached to the different types 
within a greatly consistent framework; in other words, depending on to which 
possible expression of the genus-species or the whole-part conceptual pairs can be 
related the issue in question, a different result would be triggered. Such a high level 
of abstraction, however, is impossible by the very nature of law.116 Legal problems, 
as they are, often refer to extralegal circumstances. Systematization within the legal 
order is only of secondary importance in comparison with the non-logical factors: 
“Within the field of law […] logic is only a secondary instrument as compared to the 
primary, alogical, will-driven components.”117 Furthermore, it is not only the will-
driven components but also the objective laws of physics and the state of 
                                                          
114 MOÓR, GYULA, A jogbölcselet problémái, [Problems of the Jurisprudence] (1945) Budapest, pp. 
60-61. Cited by SOLT, cit. p. 10. 
115 VARGA, CSABA, Politikum és logikum a jogban. A  jog társadalomelmélete felé, [Politics and 
Logics in the Law, Towards the Social Approach of Law] (1987) Budapest, pp. 230-231. 
116 In harmony with KASER, cit. p. 383. 
117 MOÓR, cit. p. 41. 
 86
www.ridrom.uclm.es  Abril - 2009 
development of disciplines which determine what law is. For example, the questions 
of what fiction to establish with respect to the date of conception or what legal 
consequences to be triggered by the mixing up of two liquids are, after all, matters of 




Legal concepts which are inevitable building blocks of all legal systems are, as 
a matter of fact, fictions, which mean that all legal systems must be necessarily 
fictions as well. However, the non-existence of these concepts may be excused if they 
have a specific function in the legal order.118 In case of the inner systems of law, 
nevertheless, not only the real abstractions and the real things standing behind the 
system are missing, but in most cases even the functionality is absent. As a result, the 
scientific nature of legal concepts can be barely acknowledged (with the concurrent 
statement of their limited validity), but the inner systems of law are even more 
difficult to approve of scientifically. These inner systems may serve didactic purposes 
and only indirectly may they contribute to the better understanding of legal problems 
or the application of law.119 “Jurisprudence is only bound by the requirement-content 
of law (Forderungsgehalt) at all times, however, in its discretion it may apply new 
words or may constitute new concepts for the better expression of this content if it 
considers it to be necessary; it may also split the given legal propositions and 
concepts into its parts in order to create new concepts from them with the help of 
which the requirement-content can be rephrased in terms of new propositions and 
these, again, may be incorporated into an optional system.”120 
                                                          
118 The law can affect the reality through these terms, and it can fulfil its social function, the 
regulation of future actions. See SOLT,  cit.  pp. 4-5. 
119 VARGA, cit. p. 123. 
120 SOMLÓ, cit. p. 17. 
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The multi-perspective approach made it possible to define the concept of 
general clauses as a prospective basis for further investigations complemented by 
linguistic and dogmatic observations as discussed above. As it has been illustrated, 
general clauses always function as extensive parts of a source of law, their species are 
relative, and also, they constitute a whole, which is greater than the sum of its same 
specied parts and enjoys an autonomous existence.  
 
 
General clauses are such general legal propositions which constitute an 
extensive but also isolated and autonomous structural part (clausula) within a given, 
same specied collective of norms. Their subject-matter is quite extensive and contrary 
to specific legal norms, they incorporate a relatively large number of states of affaires 
which are – as a result of some of their dominant characteristics – considered to be of 
the same genus (generalis). From these aspects emerges an interpretational practice 
according to which the alteration of the specific legal norms impact upon the 
interpretation of general clauses and vice versa: through general clauses the alteration 
of a superior category may be conveyed to the more specific norms.121 
 
To sum up the above-stated, it can be concluded that the dogmatic difficulties 
related to general clauses derive predominantly from the fact that the concept and the 
content of this term unites two antagonistic approaches. Formally, assuming an 
external and formal system, general clauses suggest through the genus-species and 
the whole-part relationships that law can be cognitively approached whereas 
substantially, they seek to come over the flaws of the self-contained theoretical 
                                                          
121 The term ’general clause’ was used in a wider sense by PÓLAY. See PÓLAY, ELEMÉR, Historische 
Interpretationen der Generalklauseln im römischen Recht, Klio 67 (1985) p. 528.  
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system by pointing to the internal characteristics of law. The legal order cannot reach 
complete self-containment, the realm of effectively operative norms is always open 
and fragmental122 or at least it should remain so if it attempts to adapt efficiently to 
the rapidly changing conditions of living.123 Jurisprudence is a cognitive discipline 
(verstehende Wissenschaft) which ought to align itself with its subject and not with 
exact rules.124 
 
122 On the gaps in the law see MOÓR, cit. p. 13. For different standing-point see RENÉ, DAVID—
BRIERLY, JOHN E, Major Legal Systems in the World Today, (1985) London, p. 151. 
123 VORLÄNDER, cit. pp. 403-404, and WINDELBAND, cit. p. 517. 
124 “Sollte den System allgemeiner Rechtsprinzipien ein korrespondierendes System von 
Rechtsbegriffen zugeordnet werden.” See LARENZ—CANARIS, cit. pp. 264-265. 
